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Arctic Energy Resources: Security and Environmental
Implications
Abstract
In recent years, there has been considerable interest in the Arctic as a source for
resources, as a potential zone for commercial shipping, and as a region that might
experience conflict due to its strategic importance. With regards to energy resources, some
studies suggest that the region contains upwards of 13 percent of global undiscovered oil,
30 percent of undiscovered gas, and multiples more of gas hydrates. The decreasing
amount and duration of Arctic ice cover suggests that extraction of these resources will be
increasingly commercially viable. Arctic and non-arctic states wish to benefit from the
region's resources and the potential circum-polar navigation possibilities. This has led to
concerns about the environmental risks of these operations as well as the fear that
competition between states for resources might result in conflict. Unresolved offshore
boundaries between the Arctic states exacerbate these fears. Yet, the risk of conflict seems
overstated considering the bilateral and multilateral steps undertaken by the Arctic states
to resolve contentious issues. This article will examine the potential impact of Arctic energy
resources on global security as well as the regional environment and examine the actions
of concerned states to promote their interests in the region.
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Abstract
In recent years, there has been considerable interest in the Arctic as a
source for resources, as a potential zone for commercial shipping, and as a
region that might experience conflict due to its strategic importance. With
regards to energy resources, some studies suggest that the region contains
upwards of 13 percent of global undiscovered oil, 30 percent of undiscovered gas, and multiples more of gas hydrates. The decreasing amount and
duration of Arctic ice cover suggests that extraction of these resources will
be increasingly commercially viable. Arctic and non-arctic states wish to
benefit from the region's resources and the potential circum-polar navigation possibilities. This has led to concerns about the environmental risks
of these operations as well as the fear that competition between states for
resources might result in conflict. Unresolved offshore boundaries
between the Arctic states exacerbate these fears. Yet, the risk of conflict
seems overstated considering the bilateral and multilateral steps undertaken by the Arctic states to resolve contentious issues. This article will
examine the potential impact of Arctic energy resources on global security
as well as the regional environment and examine the actions of concerned
states to promote their interests in the region.2

Introduction
In recent years, there has been considerable interest in the Arctic as a
source for resources, a zone of commercial transit, and as the potential
site of future conflict. Contemporary focus on the region has increased
because of the apparent reduction in ice-cover and the lengthening of iceJournal of Strategic Security
(c) 2012 ISSN: 1944-0464 eISSN: 1944-0472
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free navigation periods attributed to climate change. There is speculation
that this trend will continue and open up the Arctic for more use. Many of
the analyses concerning the development of this region suggest that it will
occur with great haste, lead to significant environmental damage, and will
take place with a heightened risk of conflict amongst the competing powers. While this view makes for compelling reading, it is dubious for several
reasons that will be explored below by examining three key components
to Arctic security.
The first component is the consideration of energy resources. Sources
forecast that global population and economic growth will continue
increasing for the future, suggesting that there will also be a rising
requirement for energy resources to sustain this increase. This has led to
concerns about how this future energy demand will be met. To meet this
need, the global oil and gas industry has continued to seek new reserves to
satisfy the demand for these strategic resources. Since the so-called "easy"
reserves have been claimed and are subsequently being developed, exploration has taken companies to more remote and challenging oil and gas
properties. One area that has sparked considerable interest in recent
years has been the Arctic. This interest is based primarily on the assessment that there are considerable oil and gas resources there, particularly
offshore, as well as the perception that the ice coverage is diminishing,
thereby easing access to these reserves. This alignment of factors has
some observers speculating that there will be a massive increase in Arctic
oil and gas operations in the near term.
The second component is the examination of Arctic shipping routes. The
reduced ice coverage has also sparked interest in using the Arctic, particularly the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in Russia's territorial waters, as a
route for transporting goods between Asia and Europe. This route reduces
the distance and time required to move these goods to market thereby
cutting shipping costs. It is anticipated that use of the Arctic for transporting goods will increase dramatically in the coming years.
The third and final component analysed is the issue of boundary disputes
and the potential for conflict. Complicating the use and development of
the region are the unresolved boundary disputes among the Arctic countries. These disagreements have led some analysts and media pundits to
suggest that there will be an increased likelihood of armed conflict as
countries and companies vie for resources in contested areas.
This article will deconstruct the perception that Arctic development will
occur rapidly, accompanied by environmental damage and with much
potential for conflict, by offering reasons why events might occur in a
14
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more benign manner. To accomplish this, the article will examine the
energy resource potential of the region, the opening of sea transit routes,
and the likelihood of conflict attributable to Arctic development. Finally,
the potential environmental risks that the energy and shipping developments pose to the region will be briefly explored in each of the identified
sections.

Arctic Energy Resource Developments
Potential Resources
Oil and gas recovery operations have occurred in the Arctic region for several decades, making the presence of resources there old news. The combination of climate and terrain has increased the operating costs, thereby
maintaining a brake on rapid development. The sustained high cost of
energy resources, especially oil, has renewed the interest of companies
and some governments in the region. So, too, has the loss of access to
reserves for International Oil Companies (IOCs) due to the nationalization of many areas of the world. The ratio of National Oil Companies
(NOCs) to IOCs has changed dramatically since the 1970s when the major
IOCs controlled a majority of global reserves and, in 1972, produced
roughly 93 percent of global crude. However, this balance was reversed by
2008 when nationalized companies held approximately 92 percent of
total global reserves and the NOCs accounted for 81.5 percent of total global oil production.3 From these statistics, it is clear that NOCs dominate
contemporary oil markets. Furthermore, this trend is unlikely to change
in the near-term given the tendency in countries like Venezuela and Ecuador to continue nationalizing their internal operations as well as the substantial global reserve acquisition efforts of Chinese, Indian, and other
NOCs.
Reserve ownership by NOCs does not necessarily exclude participation by
IOCs in the development of these resources. However, recent history is
replete with cases where contractual agreements were changed to the disadvantage of the IOCs by the host country after significant development
of the reserves had taken place. Thus, the IOCs put themselves at considerable financial risk entering into agreements with some countries that
operate nationalized companies. This risk has led many IOCs to seek
development opportunities in areas that are not controlled by NOCs, and
many regions of the Arctic meet this criterion.

15
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IOCs are not the only companies looking to benefit from the potential to
develop these resources at profit. Two of the Arctic states, Norway and
Russia, both operate NOCs that are already extensively engaged in operations in the region. Both Russia and Norway also have plans to increase
their extraction operations in the Arctic as existing fields in other areas
mature and become less productive. Indeed, a recently discovered oil field
in Norway's Barents Sea is estimated to hold 3.66 billion barrels and is
expected to be producing by 2013.4 For both Russia and Norway,
expanded operations in the Arctic will enable them to meet ongoing contractual sales obligations. In Russia's case, increased activity in the Arctic
will also enable it to sell more oil and gas to the Asian market. China is
another country that operates NOCs and has also expressed interest in
gaining access to Arctic resources. Hence, the Arctic not only offers
opportunities for IOCs seeking unclaimed reserves, but also for NOCs
seeking to maintain or increase their output.
Underlying this interest in the Arctic is the prospect that oil and gas
resources are present in sufficient quantities to justify the expenditure of
billions of dollars to develop them. A 2008 United States Geological Survey (USGS) report suggested that there are substantial amounts of undiscovered oil and gas throughout the Arctic. The report states that the mean
estimates indicate "that 90 billion barrels of oil [BBO], 1,669 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may
remain to be found in the Arctic, of which approximately 84 percent is
expected to occur offshore."5 This amount represents roughly 13 percent
of the global mean estimate of undiscovered oil and 40 percent of the global mean estimate of undiscovered gas.6 While the amounts that are
recoverable may vary significantly—either up or down, the potential for
oil and gas extraction in the Arctic is substantial.
An important resource that was not analyzed in the USGS report is gas
hydrates, which is another energy source that might become viable in the
future. It is estimated that there are between 6–600 times the amounts of
gas hydrates versus conventional gas deposits in the world, so they could
extend the fossil fuel age well into the future. Gas hydrates are comprised
of methane and water frozen into a solid beneath the seafloor or under
permafrost. The methane is concentrated due to the crystal structure of
the hydrates resulting in a density of 164 m3 of methane gas in each 1 m3
of methane hydrate, making it much denser than conventional methane
reserves. However, with contemporary technology, gas hydrates are
difficult to extract without risking environmental damage—particularly
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the uncontrolled escape of green house gases. Research to develop a safe
extraction process continues and may be commercially viable before
2030, making the Arctic a potential source of future gas hydrate
exploitation.7

Extraction Challenges
While there are interested parties taking on projects in the region, the
pace of developments in the Arctic is likely to be slower than many of the
forecasts suggest. This is primarily due to the two factors examined below.
The first is the difficult operating environment and climate. The second is
the availability of other development opportunities in less challenging
areas.
It is generally believed that Arctic ice cover might become thinner and
permit longer periods of navigable water than was the case in the past.
However, the degree to which this will occur remains to be seen. Furthermore, even with reduced ice cover for parts of the year, there will still be a
substantial amount of ice hampering transportation and operations. This
ice has a profound effect on operations. It increases costs since the platforms, pipelines, and ships used in the exploration, extraction, and transportation of oil and gas must all be built to a tougher standard in order to
reduce the risk of destruction or damage from the ice packs. Moreover, a
system of ice flow monitoring must be put in place to keep watch for icebergs that might cause damage to facilities, equipment, or personnel.
Strengthened construction and surveillance and warning systems add to
the cost of operating in the Arctic and reduce the profit margin for oil and
gas companies.
An additional cost factor related to Arctic operations is the very limited
drilling season. Generally, weather and ice coverage limits drilling in the
region to less than two months per year. Hence, for drilling operations to
take place the equipment has to be transported to a staging area and
assembled as required prior to the drilling season; this includes the crews
who have to wait until the ice coverage diminishes sufficiently before
commencing operations. Since these sites are remote, the transportation
and sustenance costs are often quite high. Storms or unanticipated ice can
delay operations or lead to their cancellation. Once the drilling season
reaches its end, the drilling site must be capped and the rig removed to a
safe location that could be quite distant from the work area. This cycle
occurs each year as the wells are drilled, adding significant costs to Arctic
operations as compared to drilling in other less inhospitable regions.

17
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Another consideration in the Arctic is the increased challenge of protecting the environment. The region is a very fragile habitat given its unique
characteristics—waters that are ice-free for limited periods, if at all, and a
collection of flora and fauna that have adapted to the harsh environment
and are subsequently unique to the Arctic. The water's depths are also
generally shallow, creating a situation where any spills would be concentrated and their impact potentially more severe than they might be in
deeper waters where more dissipation occurs. A nightmare scenario
involving an oil spill covered by ice is also possible. Should this come to
pass, it could defy detection and clean up for a very long time, thereby
increasing the damage to the environment.
The sensitive nature of the Arctic environment combined with the
increased risks posed by the climate and ice necessitates more rigorous
disaster response protocols than in most other regions. The companies
operating in the Arctic have taken steps to plan for and prepare to deal
with spills and other disasters related to accidents. However, these safeguards have not been tested in real-life situations, so it is not clear that
they will be adequate if required. This creates uncertainty over the ability
to manage accidents and disasters in the region. The British Petroleum
(BP) Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico is illustrative in
that the crisis management teams were pushed to the limit and arguably
not successful in managing the immediate disaster even though this event
occurred in a region where there was ready access to all types of response
equipment and personnel.8 It is unlikely that the same resources could be
so easily accessed in or transported to many parts of the Arctic given its
remoteness and harsh climate.
The isolation of the region also leads to a transportation challenge, especially in terms of getting the product to market. Pipelines might be an
option in some cases, although pipelines across permafrost—particularly
thawing permafrost—are subject to frost heave or sinking, meaning they
can buckle and develop leaks as a result. This would increase the risk of
environmental disaster. Another option is shipping, although that too is
subject to the vagaries of the local conditions. The Arctic's environment,
climate, and distance to markets will not only increase the challenges that
developers face, but will also increase the operating costs. These costs
might not be prohibitive, but they might dissuade some companies from
operating in the region.
Finally, the global economy has not fully recovered from the economic
downturn that struck in 2008, so demand is lower than many analysts
forecast it would be by this time.9 This situation has already affected the
long-awaited development of the Shtokman gas field in Russia's Barents
18
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Sea sector. The initial plan was for a consortium, controlled by Gazprom
and including France's Total and Norway's Statoil, to begin marketing
Shtokman gas in 2013, but this date has been pushed to 2015.10 It
remains to be seen if the planned investment in Arctic oil and gas operations will actually occur.

Alternatives to Arctic Energy Investments
Another issue when considering the pace of possible Arctic oil and gas
operations is the potential for other developments in different parts of the
world. As noted, there is considerable competition for access to lucrative
properties. There are other options that are less risky and, therefore,
might slow the pace of Arctic developments. Some of these alternatives
are considered in this section.
Perhaps the most influential contemporary development is that of shale
gas in the United States. Until recently, shale gas was considered too difficult to extract profitably; however, with improvements in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (fracking), some of these reserves are now
commercially viable. Shale gas production in the United States has consequently soared to the point where it comprised roughly 23 percent of gas
produced in 2010. However, earlier estimates of recoverable shale gas
reserves in the United States were too high, leading some experts to question the sustainability of the resource.11
Shale gas is not limited to the United States. A recent United States
Energy Information Administration report indicated that there are 48
shale gas basins in 32 countries. The study further estimated that the
technically recoverable amount of gas in these basins is 6,622 trillion
cubic feet (tcf). Total global recoverable gas, not including shale gas, is
estimated at 16,000 tcf, so the added shale gas boosts the total over 40
percent to 22,622 tcf.12 Since these estimates were made without substantial drilling, they may be inaccurate. Still, this boost in the global potential
recoverable gas might reduce the desire of some companies to invest in
more risky Arctic extraction operations.
There are also questions concerning the environmental sustainability of
fracking given that its critics suggest that it has a negative impact on the
environment and water tables. The depletion rate of shale gas reserves is
also faster than conventional gas reserves, necessitating re-drilling to
access the resource more frequently than is the case with conventional gas
operations. These factors might cool the interest and viability in shale gas
in some areas, although it seems that in other markets production will
continue to rise. The world is undergoing a slow transition that will see
19
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gas replace oil in many uses. Consequently, reliance on gas is expected to
rise, and this trend might trigger an increase in Arctic gas extraction operations. However, it seems likely that the short-term focus will be on shale
gas and other options in more hospitable environments.
Shale gas is only one alternative for companies and countries seeking to
increase their energy supply. Coal Bed Methane (CBM) extraction technology has improved to the point where it is becoming viable in areas
where the resource is present. A longer-term alternative to traditional
piped gas has been Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) that, along with shale
gas and CBM, has had a dramatic impact on global gas markets. For
instance, in some markets gas now trades as a fungible product with spot
prices instead of prices linked to that of oil, as it did previously. Consequently, gas prices in some markets have dropped significantly in recent
years. According to a Bloomberg report, prices in North America have
recently dropped to a 10-year low and market analysts anticipate the price
to stay near this range at least through 2012.13 However, as the cold 2011–
2012 winter in Europe demonstrated, some markets can still experience
painful price spikes when demand remains high for long periods. This
suggests that the development of alternative gas supplies has not permeated the entire global market. Until it does, there may still be pressure to
push on with Arctic development.
Additionally, there have recently been large conventional gas discoveries
in areas outside the Arctic. Since the late 2000s, for example, a few key
discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean offshore have dramatically
improved the prospects that gas will be developed there in significant
quantities. In 2009, Noble Energy confirmed that its Tamar field is estimated to contain 238 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas. In 2010, Noble
announced the discovery of the Leviathan field, also in the eastern Mediterranean, with an estimated 453 bcm, making it the largest deepwater
gas discovery of the last decade.14 While there is considerable investment
required to develop these fields, and some tensions surrounding the location of continental shelf boundaries in the region, it is possible that these
finds could dramatically alter the balance of gas available to Europe, the
Middle East, and North Africa in the future.
Although not as plentiful as gas, there are also potential alternative
options for companies seeking to extract more oil in the future. For example, reserves offshore of Brazil are estimated to be significant enough that
their extraction might put that country near the top of global annual producers in the future. Unfortunately, these reserves are found at great
depth and below thick layers of salt, which creates significant technical
challenges. However, recent advancements show promise that these hur20
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dles will be overcome in the coming years. Another region that might be
capable of increased annual production is the Canadian Oil Sands. While
rendering the bitumen into synthetic crude is energy intensive and more
expensive than conventional oil production, with consistent sustained
high prices, oil sands crude production is economically viable and companies continue to invest and expand operations. The relative political stability in Canada as compared to other countries with marketable oil
reserves is a major selling point for many companies.
In addition to options such as Brazil offshore or the Canadian Oil Sands,
the sustained high price of oil is making many reserves around the
world—once considered too difficult to extract—now seem viable for production. Generally, these reserves, like the gas options mentioned above,
are located in regions where development can continue year-round,
thereby lowering the investment risk for companies and offering stable
supply options for markets.
Thus, while there are prospects for increasing global oil and gas production by developing potential Arctic reserves, there are also many compelling reasons that suggest these developments will evolve slowly. For
instance, the conditions in the Arctic, while increasingly ice-free in some
regions, are still extremely difficult to operate in and the drilling season is
quite short compared to other year-round options. The environmental
risks also increase, contributing to higher cost infrastructure and accident
response protocols. These factors increase the operating costs in comparison to other less restrictive locations. The distance to markets is significant in most cases leading to more expenditure on transport or pipelines.
Finally, while it is true that the so-called "easy oil" is gone, there are still
lucrative reserves of oil and gas in other parts of the world that often have
more accommodating circumstances. In light of these considerations,
development of Arctic oil and gas operations is more likely to occur gradually than rapidly.

Arctic Shipping
Aside from the potential access to resources that the diminishing ice cover
affords, there is much interest in using the periodic open water to
enhance global shipping. The opportunity to make use of the Northern
Sea Route (NSR) in Russia's Arctic waters, as well as the Northwest Passage (NWP) in Canada's Arctic waters, might dramatically increase the
amount of shipping that transits the Arctic, particularly between Asia and
Europe. The NWP could cut as much as 2,500 statute miles off the route
between Europe and Asia, while the NSR would reduce voyages by
21
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approximately 3,000 nautical miles (3,453 statute miles) and save
roughly twenty-two days sailing time.15 With rising fuel costs, these
shorter distances would result in significant savings for shippers and
would enhance supply chains by decreasing the time for products to
arrive to market. Finally, these routes provide alternatives to the key
intercontinental shipping chokepoints: The Malacca Strait, Suez Canal,
and Panama Canal.
Russia is intent on opening up its passage for more shipping traffic. In its
2009 Arctic strategy document, the Russian Government indicated that
developing the region's resources and improving the NSR were its fundamental goals.16 Expanding the use of the NSR will permit Russia to export
more of the oil and gas it intends to produce, as well as to market other
resources extracted in the Russian North. This approach, in turn, will generate revenue for the Russian ice-breaker fleet since Russia has made
escort by one of its ice-breakers, for a fee, a requirement for ships transiting the NSR.17 In short, the Russian Government views the opening of
this route a key component of its revenue generating capacity.
While it is possible that the NWP will open to more frequent commercial
shipping and could become a regular summer route for commercial shipping, it is not as developed as, nor as ice free for as long a time as is the
NSR. Given these realities, it seems unlikely that the NWP will experience
a shipping increase to the same extent as the NSR.
More frequent shipping traffic in the Arctic does entail increased environmental risk, although the degree of risk remains to be seen. It will depend
on the amount of traffic that opts for these northern lanes, the type of cargoes, the condition of the vessels, and the extent to which the transits are
monitored and supported. In the NSR, for example, icebreakers escort
ships as a matter of routine. This reduces the likelihood of any vessels
being trapped in the ice. Search and rescue in the Arctic is constrained by
the vast distances between populated centres and the climate. So, it is
possible that response to a shipping accident might not be as robust as it
would be in other more accessible areas. Therefore, while it is logical that
the risk of accident and thus environmental damage will be heightened
due to potential increased shipping activity, it remains to be seen what the
real impact might be.
Another environmental concern will be the increase in pollution resulting
from more frequent passage of ships. In spite of safeguards and procedures to minimize pollution, it is inevitable that passing ships will leave
behind some level of pollution, be it minor or major. This, too, will have a
negative consequence on the region unless it is managed effectively.
22
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Increased shipping in the Arctic might have positive environmental
impact elsewhere on the planet. One of the positive aspects of opening up
these routes is that it will lessen shipping traffic using one of the other
major chokepoint routes. With fewer vessels on these routes, the local
environmental risks will be somewhat reduced. Another security related
benefit that might result from decreased shipping in some regions, particularly the Malacca Strait, is the potential reduction of piracy. With fewer
ships passing through, security services will have more time to concentrate on anti-piracy activities and pirates will have fewer targets, possibly
leading some to seek other opportunities. There will be negative impact
for states that charge transit fees along these routes and the ports and
businesses that service the ships since diminished traffic will translate
into reduced revenue, although lost revenue along the traditional routes
will mean increased revenues in the Arctic region. The degree to which
these potential outcomes occur will depend on the numbers of ships that
opt for a northern route over the traditional choices.

Conflict Risk
Discussion of the development of Arctic resources and the opening of the
region for increased ship transit is replete with suggestions that these
developments might lead to conflict. Some proponents of this view argue
that there will be fierce competition between companies and states to
access reserves in contested areas. Others suggest that there will be a
struggle between the Arctic states over the disputed boundaries.18 On the
surface, there may be some justification for these concerns given that the
boundaries along the continental shelves of the Arctic states have not yet
been settled. While these speculations make for interesting discussions,
conflict seems unlikely, barring a major disruptive change in the international system.
To understand the potential for conflict, it is necessary to gain an appreciation of where the anticipated oil and gas resources are believed to lie.
The USGS report mentioned previously outlines this in detail. It suggests
that the Arctic region is divided into thirds with one-third onshore, onethird continental shelf, and one-third deep ocean basin. The study also
notes that the deep ocean basin areas—areas over which there are border
disagreements—contain few hydrocarbon resources. Most of the
resources lie on the continental shelves or onshore.19 According to the
report, 60 percent of the estimated oil resource is located in six locations:
The Alaska Platform, Canning-Mackenzie Basin, North Barents Basin,
Northwest Greenland Rifted Margin, South Danmarkshavn Basin, and
the North Danmarkshavn Salt Basin. Of these, the Alaska Platform is the
23
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most significant in that it is estimated to contain approximately 31 percent of the undiscovered Arctic oil. Similarly, approximately 66 percent of
undiscovered gas is believed to lie in just four areas: The South Kara Sea,
South Barents Basin, North Barents Basin, and the Alaska Platform. Of
these, the South Kara Sea, a Russian possession, is believed to contain
nearly 39 percent of undiscovered gas.20 The borders claimed by the Arctic states are generally not disputed in the areas anticipated to contain significant hydrocarbon deposits; hence, neither are the resources that lie
within them. This somewhat belies the notion that there will be conflict
over resource deposits in the Arctic.
Moreover, the Arctic countries have agreed to resolve their boundary disputes through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).21 Under UNCLOS, the UN Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS) was established to adjudicate the delineation of
the outer limits of continental shelves and maritime boundaries. Arctic
states, in turn, must submit their boundary claims to the CLCS within ten
years of ratifying UNCLOS.22 Russia and Norway have already submitted
their claims while Canada has until 2013 and Denmark has until 2014 to
do so. The United States has not ratified UNCLOS because of the concern
on the part of some senators that doing so would cede too much power to
the United Nations. The perception that the United States might lose out
on its claims if it is the only Arctic state not to file a submission to CLCS
may lead the Senate to agree to ratification in the near-term, although this
remains to be seen.23 Despite not ratifying UNCLOS, the United States
joined the other four Arctic states in issuing the Ilulissat Declaration on
May 28, 2008, affirming that each state would resort to the legal framework of the law of the sea to resolve any claims.24 While the declaration
did not refer to UNCLOS by name, it did note that the law of the sea is the
overarching framework to resolve any disputes. The agreement by the
Arctic states to resolve their disputes through this framework suggests
that the overlapping boundary issues will be settled amicably, although it
is likely that they will take some time to be finalized.
Another multilateral forum that the Arctic states make use of to enhance
cooperation in the region is the Arctic Council. All the region's countries
are members of the Council through which they periodically meet to discuss and manage issues that affect the Arctic. Its membership includes
Canada, Denmark (due to its tie with Greenland and the Faroe Islands),
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. Additionally, there are six permanent observer states including France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Other
states can apply to attend meetings of the Council as observers on an ad
hoc basis. China has applied for permanent observer status, but its appli24
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cation has not yet been accepted. China is interested in increasing its
voice regarding Arctic issues since it hopes to benefit from the resource
potential of the region and the shorter shipping routes. While generally a
forum for discussion and consultation, the Arctic Council set a milestone
in May 2011 by signing the Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue
Agreement, the first legally binding agreement negotiated under its auspices.25 This agreement will increase the cooperation between the Arctic
states when search and rescue operations are required. Furthermore, the
document is indicative of the cooperation amongst the members of the
Arctic Council.
While there are many examples of cooperation amongst the Arctic states,
some uncertainty regarding Russia's intentions has persisted. This
occurred particularly during the first presidency of Vladimir Putin when
his statements asserting Russia's intent to defend its claims in the Arctic
stepped up considerably. In fact, some military action did occur to back
up this rhetoric as noted in the recommencement of long-range bomber
flights (used extensively throughout the Cold War period) and increased
activity on the part of Russia's Northern Fleet.26 Additionally, there were
pledges made to increase the number and role of Russian security forces
in the region. Perhaps most symbolic of all this activity was the August
2007 planting of the Russian flag underwater in a contested area of the
Lomonsov Ridge.27 In addition to these acts, the Russian Government
also made announcements indicating that they were taking steps to
enhance border security and their military ground forces in the Arctic.
These actions were interpreted by the West as potentially hostile and worrisome. However, it is important to view them in the context of the setbacks Russia perceived in the early years of Putin's presidency. Putin, for
instance, felt slighted by the West over the NATO-led bombing campaign
against Serbia, as well as by the development of closer ties between
Ukraine and Georgia and the West. Against this backdrop, Putin's actions
in the Arctic were in part aimed at shoring up nationalist sentiments in
Russia in order to support his government rather than sending provocative signals to Russia's Arctic neighbours. It is useful to compare the very
militaristic Russian Arctic policy document published in 2001 with the
one published in 2009. The latter document is far less bellicose than its
predecessor and refers to cooperation with Arctic neighbours as the preferred course, suggesting a moderating tone and intent in Russia's Arctic
policy.28
Russia's actions, more importantly, need to be considered in the context
of the difficulties that the country faces due to its economic and demographic challenges. The Russian economy, for instance, is decidedly
dependent on oil and gas exports, thereby limiting the development of
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other sectors and leaving it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles. Russia's
economy is also notoriously corrupt and lacks legal protection for investors, which reduces its ability to attract new capital and potential business
partners. Yet, its oil and gas companies need external investors and partners to successfully develop the Arctic reserves. Demographically, Russia
has suffered from a sustained decline in population that also threatens to
undermine its economy in the coming years. These structural challenges,
in turn, have limited Russia's ability to improve its military capabilities.29
These limits on Russia's national power militate toward a cooperative military and diplomatic agenda rather than a confrontational one.
Indeed, a review of Russia's cooperation with its Arctic neighbours reinforces this view. Consider that Russia has agreed to work within the
framework of the UN to settle its delimitation. Russia was also able to
reach a bilateral agreement with Norway in September 2010 to settle their
ongoing boundary dispute in the Barents Sea.30 In another announcement around that time, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, affirmed
Russia's commitment to resolving the boundary dispute with Canada
regarding the Lamonsov Ridge through the UNCLOS process.31 Moreover, Russia has cooperated with the other Arctic countries to coordinate
and assist in Arctic search and rescue missions. These are the substantive
issues pertaining to the Arctic making it clear that Russia has been generally cooperative despite its occasional provocative rhetoric and associated
activity.
There are many additional recent examples of cooperation amongst the
Arctic countries to settle potentially contentious issues. As noted above,
Russia and Norway were able to bilaterally settle their ongoing Barents
Sea boundary disagreement. Canada and Denmark have agreed to settle
their territorial dispute over Hans Island on the boundary between
Greenland's and Canada's territorial waters. Iceland and Norway agreed
to jointly develop a potential oil and gas reserve that straddles the boundary between their respective territorial waters. These are all examples of
the cooperation between the Arctic countries in settling potentially fractious issues and suggest that their relations will continue to be managed
in a cooperative manner rather than a conflicted one.32
The Chinese Government's desire to access the Arctic resources as well as
to use the region as an option for the transport of its goods is sometimes
cited as another conflict risk. China does have a great stake in the Arctic in
that 46 percent of its GDP is dependent on shipping, and shortened sailing times would enhance its economy significantly. Its economic growth is
also dependent on energy and other resources that it can obtain from the
Arctic region. China's support for Iceland during its recent banking crisis
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was viewed by many as an attempt by Beijing to gain influence in order to
use Iceland as a trans-shipment point in the future should the NSR open
up. The thinking is that Chinese shippers will use very large cargo container vessels to cross the Arctic on the NSR, and then divide the cargoes
to smaller carriers in Iceland to be sent to their final destinations in
Europe as well as along the Eastern Seaboard of North America.33 In light
of this, it appears that China is focused on making use of the NSR to move
its goods to market. China is also interested in seeking out resources in
the Arctic to sustain its economy. This fits the pattern that the Chinese
exhibit throughout the world where their firms are busy securing energy
supplies. The idea that either of these activities should create conflict
seem unlikely in that China already ships its goods around the world, and
is already engaged in global energy markets to acquire resources. Neither
of these activities has led to contemporary conflict with the Chinese nor is
there currently any reason to suspect they will in the foreseeable future.
A final consideration regarding the potential for conflict in the region is
the status of the Arctic countries themselves. Both Russia and the United
States are nuclear weapons powers who possess substantial conventional
forces, and they hold permanent seats with veto power within the UN
Security Council. Five of the Arctic Council members also belong to
NATO; these include: Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and the United
States. Another member of the Arctic Council, Sweden, cooperates closely
with NATO. It seems unlikely that any country would risk starting a conflict in such a strategic environment.

Conclusion
There are potentially large reserves of gas and oil in the Arctic region that
will be developed in the future. However, given the difficult operating
conditions due to the climate and geography, it seems that this development will take place gradually rather than rapidly as some analysts suggest. Aside from the difficult operational environment, there are other
options outside of the Arctic, as noted above, that will occupy some of the
companies that might otherwise invest in the Arctic region. The degree to
which these trends will impact the pace of Arctic development is not clear
but it seems likely that development will occur slowly.
Another issue that will place limits on the pace of Arctic oil and gas development is the heightened environmental risk that these operations
involve. While companies have contingency plans, equipment, and some
Arctic-specific emergency response procedures developed, these have not
been tested in a real situation creating some uncertainty regarding the
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ability to manage accidents in the region. Given that BP is still settling its
liabilities stemming from the recent disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, it
seems likely that other companies will tread cautiously in the Arctic due
to the risk of environmental disaster. This is not to say that these concerns
will halt activity in the region, but it appears likely that new operations
will evolve slowly in order to mitigate environmental risk and subsequent
loss of revenue due to any mishap.
There is additional uncertainty surrounding the potential for conflict
between Arctic countries or others from outside the region. While there
has been various provocative actions and rhetoric in the recent past by
some of the Arctic countries, it seems that these occurred for domestic
political consumption more than they were intended as signals to other
countries. Indeed, the record of cooperation amongst the Arctic countries
in resolving contentious issues to date has been good. Moreover, these
countries have all agreed to abide by the UNCLOS to resolve the
delimitation of their continental shelves. In fact, the generally accepted
study on the oil and gas deposits in the regions suggest that most of the
major reserves will be found within the continental shelf areas of the
Arctic countries in areas that are not contested. This suggests that most of
the development will occur in regions not likely to result in tensions or
conflicts.
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